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ANTITRUST PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FERS-United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 648 F.2d 642
(9th Cir. 1981).
In 1970 the Department of Justice brought an antitrust action against
Westinghouse Electric Corporation and two Japanese corporations, Mi-
tsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Ltd. (MHI) (together Mitsubishi). The government alleged violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. ' Since 1923 the defendants or their prede-
cessors had a series of technology-sharing agreements under which West-
inghouse granted licenses of its Japanese patents to Mitsubishi. It ex-
cluded its counferpart patents in the United States and Canada from the
agreements. The government contended that Mitsubishi had become so
dependent on Westinghouse technology because of the technology-shar-
ing agreements that it could not enter the United States or Canadian mar-
kets without the patent licenses. Thus the licensing agreements restrained
competition. The government asked the court to terminate the agreements
and to require Westinghouse to license Mitsubishi under its United States
patents. 2
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in 1978. 3 In United States v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.,4 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the right to refuse to license a pat-
ent was the "untrammeled right" 5 of the patentee and that granting the
relief requested would seriously undermine the patent system. 6
This Note examines the conflicts between patent and antitrust laws and
refers to a framework for resolving these conflicts using the legislative
policies behind the laws. The Note concludes that the dismissal of the
complaint was proper but suggests that in not providing an analytical
basis for its decision, the court failed to clarify the law involving restric-
tions in patent-licensing agreements.
1. The Westinghouse case resulted from a period of activity by the Department of Justice's Anti-
trust Division concentrating on foreign technology licensing. See Wallace, Overlooked Opportuni-
ties-Making the Most Out of United States Antitrust Limitations on International Licensing Agree-
ments, 10 INT'L LAW. 275, 276 (1976).
2. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532, 535-36 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
aff d in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981). Although the govern-
ment presented this theory in its complaint, it relied chiefly on a conspiracy charge at trial.
3. Id. at 546. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), after plaintiff has presented evidence, defendant may
move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.
4. 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981).
5. Id. at 647.




A. The Antitrust Laws
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are de-
signed to promote the operation of free and unrestrained competition. 7
The major policy of the antitrust laws is efficient allocation of resources. 8
The antitrust laws are also designed to promote cost minimization and to
provide incentives for innovation. As an economic tool they are used to
distribute opportunities and to disperse economic power. 9
Section 1 of the Sherman Act 10 prohibits contracts, combinations, or
conspiracies in restraint of trade. Its prohibitions extend to restraints on
commerce with foreign countries.l' In determining whether agreements
are prohibited by the Sherman Act, courts initially decide whether to ap-
ply a rule of reason12 or a "per se" rule. 13 This determination is based on
the kind of restraint involved.
A court will find an agreement "per se illegal" if it is so plainly anti-
competitive in nature and effect that an elaborate study of the industry is
unnecessary to establish its illegality. 14 The per se rule rests on the judg-
ment that the condemned practice usually results in harm, that legitimate
objectives are rarely present, and that the categorical prohibition dis-
penses with unnecessary litigation. ' 5 An important factor in making this
preliminary assessment is whether the parties stand in a horizontal or a
7. See, e.g., United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 902 (D. Md. 1916). appeal dis-
missed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921). The Supreme Court in United States v. Topco Assoc.. 405 U.S. 596.
610 (1972), described the antitrust laws as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise."
8. See W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 1-3 (1973). The economic rationale for con-
demning monopoly is that a competitive market allocates resources to those uses consumers value
most highly. Under a monopoly, output is restricted and prices are raised so that consumers may turn
to less desirable products. These products thus inefficiently absorb resources. Id.
9. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 40 (3d ed. 1981). See also I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER.
ANTITRUST LAW § 103 (1978).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1980).
1I. "'Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. §
I.
12. See generally 11 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 314 (1978).
13. "Articulated and rather firm presumptions-the so-called per se rules-constitute the most
formal and self-conscious explications of the reasonableness standard.'" Id. at 47.
14. The Supreme Court, in National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States. 435 U.S.
679 (1978), stated:
the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the re-
straint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the
interest of the members of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy
decision has been made by the Congress.
Id. at 692.
15. II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, § 314.
Vol. 57:745, 1982
Technology Transfers and Antitrust
vertical relationship. For example, in United States v. Topco Associ-
ates, 16 the United States Supreme Court applied the per se rule to an ar-
rangement that divided markets among competitors, i.e., parties in a hori-
zontal relationship. In contrast, in Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania17 the
Court held that location restrictions imposed by a manufacturer on retail-
ers, i.e., parties in a vertical relationship, were not per se illegal.
If a court finds that the restraint is not per se violative of the Sherman
Act, it must apply the reasonableness standard. In Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, '8 Justice Brandeis listed factors that a court
should consider in determining whether'a restraint is unreasonably ad-
verse to competition. These include facts peculiar to the business; its con-
dition before and after the imposition of the restraint; the nature, history,
and effect of the restraint; and the purpose for adopting it. 19 Good inten-
tion will not save an objectionable regulation, but a court may be better
able to interpret facts if it knows the defendant's intent.
B. The Patent System
The United States Constitution grants legislative power "[t]o promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries .... ,,20 Patents fall within the constitutional grant. An ap-
plicant may obtain a patent for "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter .... ,,21 A patent applicant
must show that the invention is novel and not obvious. The patent code
imposes these limitations on patentability to protect the public interest in
freedom to use knowledge that is in the public domain. 22
The patent code provides for a 17-year period of exclusive use in ex-
change for making the information public. 23 During this period the
patentee has the options of practicing or not practicing the patent or of
16. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Prior cases applying the per se rule to territorial restraints also involved
other restraints. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (fixing of resale prices);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (price-fixing, cooperation to elimi-
nate outside competition, participation in cartels to restrict exports and imports).
17. 433 U.S. 36(1977).
18. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
19. Id. at 238.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
22. See generally Chisum, Sources of PriorArt in Patent Law, 52 WASH. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1976).
23. Patent Code, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976): "Every patent shall contain a short title of the inven-
tion and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years . .. oftheright
to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States .... "
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granting exclusive or nonexclusive licenses. 24 The patentee may bring an
infringement action against others who use the invention during the statu-
tory period. 25
The Supreme Court has characterized the patent right as a "privilege
which is conditioned by a public purpose. "26 The Court described the
purposes of the patent system as the fostering of invention and the disclo-
sure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public
to practice the invention once the patent expires. 27 The implicit assump-
tion of the patent code is that desirable social activity is stimulated by
monopoly rewards. 28 Unlike the antitrust laws, the patent code was not
intended to be a regulator of economic power. 29
The patent holder's legal monopoly is limited to the boundaries of the
patent grant. 30 There are many ways the patent holder can overstep the
boundaries of the patent grant. Therefore, courts have fashioned methods
to control an overstepping patent holder. For example, under the patent
misuse doctrine courts will not enforce the patent against infringers until
the misuse has abated. 31 When a patent holder has violated the antitrust
laws, 32 a court may order compulsory licensing. 33
24. See, e.g., Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 88 (1902).
25. The heart of the patentee's legal monopoly is "'the right to invoke the State's power to pre-
vent others from utilizing his discovery without his consent." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969).
26. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661.666 (1944).
27. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
28. "It is a premise of the patent laws that a company employing inventors must have substantial
incentive to spend money that may lead to patentable inventions." SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.. 463
F. Supp. 983, 1013 (D. Conn. 1978), remandedon othergrounds, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
The patent system has been criticized on the basis that the inventor rarely receives rewards; rather.
they go to the one adding the "finishing touch." W. BOWMAN, supra note 8, at 28 (describing
Knight's view). Nevertheless, economic analysis indicates that development of an idea is often more
costly than the initial discovery. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 416-19 (2d ed. 1980). Professor Baxter has observed that too many re-
sources may already be devoted to innovation and that many commentators "accept as absolute truth
the contrary assumption that additional encouragement of research, or at least the present amount of
encouragement, is desirable. " Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly, an
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 269 (1966). Baxter is now with the Department of Justice. as
Assistant Attorney General in charge of Antitrust.
29. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
30. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
31. P. AREEDA, supra note 9, at 587-88.
32. For example, patents may function naturally as entry barriers to firms desiring to compete in
a market by denying access to required technology, When access is blocked because of illegal ac-
tivity, such as patent accumulation for monopolistic purposes, an antitrust violation exists.
33. For a discussion of compulsory licensing in antitrust cases, see R. NORDHAUS, PATENT-ANTI-
TRUST LAW 104 (3d ed. 1977).
In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per cu-
riam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), the court ordered compulsory licensing even though it found that the
defendant had not engaged in abusive practices respecting patents. Id. at 351. In SCM Corp. v.
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C. Accommodating Patent and Antitrust Laws
The potential for conflict between patent grants and antitrust laws cre-
ates complex legal problems. Some commentators believe that patent and
antitrust laws are in harmony, sharing a common goal of efficient re-
source allocation. 34 Regardless of any economic congruency, judges treat
the two sets of laws as distinct. 35
1. The "Reasonably Adapted" Test
The United States Supreme Court has considered several cases in
which a patent holder licensed a patent in connection with an agreement
containing restrictive clauses that ordinarily would violate antitrust laws.
In Bement v. National Harrow Co., 36 the Court upheld a minimum price
clause in a licensing agreement against a Sherman Act attack. The Court
reasoned that requiring the licensee to sell at a set price was a lesser-
included right of the right to prohibit others from using the patent. 37 Simi-
larly, in United States v. General Electric Co., 38 the Court upheld a
Xerox Corp., the Second Circuit distinguished United Shoe on the ground that patents were not one
of the principal factors enabling United Shoe to take market power. 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir.
1981). The court held that when patents had been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible
under patent laws could not trigger antitrust liability. Id. at 1206.
Compulsory licensing legislation has received some attention from commentators. See Goldstein,
A Study of Compulsory Licensing, in 2 THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING 734.217 (M. Finnegan
& R. Goldscheider ed. 1980 rev. ed.) (negative appraisal). A White House Task Force recommended
legislation requiring patents that had been licensed to one person be available to all other qualified
applicants on equivalent terms. Report of President Johnson's White House Task Force on Antitrust
Policy (1968), reprinted in S. OPPFNHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 239, 241 (1975
supp. to 3d ed.). See also Baxter, supra note 28, at 347 (market subdivision through a system of
patent licensing has potential for economic harm; the solution is to compel issuance of licenses to all
qualified applicants when a license has previously been issued).
The issue of compulsory licensing takes on added complexity in the international context. The
government in Westinghouse initially requested that both Westinghouse and Mitsubishi be required to
license their respective patents. 471 F. Supp. at 536. An expert in Japanese antitrust law has observed
that such a decree probably would not be enforceable in Japan. J. Haley, United States Antitrust
Beyond the Borders-The Japanese Experience, 324 AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIES DEv. BULL. 10 (1980).
34. E.g., Bowman, supra note 8, at 1. See also Oppenheim, The Patent-Antitrust Spectrum of
Patent and Know-How License Limitations: Accommodation? Conflict? or Antitrust Supremacy?, 15
IDEA 1, 5 (1971) (patent and antitrust policy are not intrinsically in conflict; the paramount objective
of both policies is maintaining private competitive enterprise).
35. "[Tlhere can be little doubt that these two sets of laws are juridically divergent." SCM
Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 997 (D. Conn. 1978), remanded on other grounds, 645
F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
36. 186 U.S. 70(1902).
37. Id. at 93.
38. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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price-fixing clause because dictating price was "normally and reasonably
adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the [patent] monopoly. 39
Although the price-fixing aspect of General Electric was later limited
to cases involving a single licensee, 40 courts continue to use a "reason-
ably adapted" test to determine the validity of restraints in patent li-
censes. 4 1 Sometimes courts invoke this vague test without analyzing the
effects of the restraint. This is especially true when territorial restraints
are involved. For example, in Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co.,42 a
Washington corporation secured a license under a United States patent
from a European patent holder. The licensing agreement provided that the
corporation could not export articles covered by the patent to any foreign
country. The Ninth Circuit upheld the agreement on the grounds that sec-
tion 261 of the patent code permits a patent holder to impose territorial
restrictions. 43 The court did not analyze the effects of the restraint, al-
though such an examination falls within the reasonably adapted test. Fur-
thermore, section 261 validates only restrictions within the United
States 44 and the patent grant does not necessarily justify agreements di-
viding world markets. 45
39. Id. at 490.
40. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 311 (1947). See also E. GELLIIORN. ANTI-
TRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSIIELL 359-61 (2d ed. 1981). Professor Gellhorn noted that the
Supreme Court distinguished the General Electric rule of patent licensing containing price controls
whenever possible.
41. The Westinghouse court, for example, used the standard. 648 F.2d at 647.
42. 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
43. Id. at 128.
44. 35 U.S.C. § 261 provides in part:
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instru-
ment in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like
manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent. or patents, to the
whole or any specified part of the United States.
Section 261 applies only to grants of patent rights in the United States and "does not purport to
authorize assignments of extra-territorial rights and agreements allocating foreign markets gain no
immunity whatsoever by virtue of a domestic patent." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 539 n.36 (1977).
45. The Attorney General's Committee questioned Brownell to the extent it approved an export
restriction on a United States licensee. REPORT OF THE ATITORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE TO STUDY
TIlE ANTITRUST LAWS 237 n.55 (1955).
Scholars are questioning whether section 261 permits even domestic territorial restrictions in li-
censing agreements. See. e.g.. Baxter. supra note 28, at 349 ("Only by amateurish literalism or
cynical distortion can it be argued that § 261 places a general imprimatur of legality on territorial
restrictions."). Section 261 speaks of assignments, and the issue raised is whether it also applies to
licenses. According to Professor Baxter. the distinction between an assignment and a license at the
time the patent code was enacted was significant. An assignment conveyed a broad range of interests
to the transferee, including the right to bring an infringement action. A licensee, by contrast, received
only the right to practice the patent without risk of an infringement suit. Id. at 349-50. See also
Gibbons, Domestic Territorial Restrictions in Patent Transactions and the Antitrust Laws. 34 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 893. 895-900 (1966) (section 261 should not govern the validity of restrictions
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2. International Territorial Restrictions
A patent license may involve territorial restrictions. For example, it is
possible to patent the same invention under the laws of more than one
country, but the patent holder need not license all the patents. In the West-
inghouse case, for example, Westinghouse, the patent holder, restricted
Mitsubishi, the patentee, from its American market. It accomplished this
by licensing its Japanese but not its American patents. The licensing
agreement may also contain clauses prohibiting the licensee from selling
or manufacturing the products in America.
An older line of cases addresses international cartelization schemes in
which territorial restrictions play an important role. 46 The legal criteria
for assessing the validity of the territorial restrictions are not clear be-
cause the cases involve an aggregation of abuses. An important factor is
whether the products in the agreements were actually covered by patents
or trademarks. In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI),47
the defendants engaged in patent and processes licensing agreements that
masked an illegal arrangement to divide markets. The defendants used the
licenses as a territorial assignment technique. In one ICI agreement a
clause allowed each party to sell products within a competitor's territory
if the products did not embody technology obtained from the competitor.
The clause satisfied the criterion that products incorporate the licensed
technology, but the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia found that the parties ignored this clause. 48 The defendants were un-
successful in their attempt to legitimize the territorial assignments.
In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,49 the United States Su-
preme Court refused to validate a trademark licensing agreement that the
defendant had used as a device to allocate territories. The licensing agree-
ment provided for control of the manufacture and sale of products
whether they carried the trademark or not.50
In both these cases the government proved conspiracies and that the
defendants had engaged in other illegal activities, including price-fixing.
Thus, although the existence of territorial restraints played a role in the
determinations, the cases are not definitive in assessing the antitrust im-
plications of territorial restraints in the absence of other illegal conduct.
challenged as antitrust violations); contra, Wheeler, A Reexamination ofAntitrust Law and the Exclu-
sive Territorial Grants by Patentees, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 642, 643-50 (1971).
46. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F.
Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
47. I00 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
48. Id. at561.
49. 341 U.S. 593(1951).
50. Id. at 598-99.
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II. THE WESTINGHOUSE COURT'S REASONING
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the government pre-
sented several claims to the district court including conspiracy, patent
abuse, and an illegal tying agreement in which Westinghouse forced Mi-
tsubishi to accept unwanted products. The district court rejected all the
claims. 5 1 Rather than appeal these claims, the government reverted to a
theory it alleged in its complaint but did not rely on heavily at trial.
52
The government argued that, by virtue of the long period of technology
sharing, MELCO and MHI had become so wedded to Westinghouse tech-
nology that they could not compete in the United States without infring-
ing on Westinghouse's patents. The two Mitsubishi companies are among
the largest manufacturers of electrical products outside the United States
and their entrance into the United States market would have increased
competition in a heavily concentrated market. Thus Westinghouse, by
failing to license MELCO and MHI, protected itself from competition
and violated the Sherman Act. 53
The Ninth Circuit noted the obvious tension between patent and anti-
trust laws. It observed that a patent holder could violate the antitrust laws
by seeking to expand the patent monopoly through, among other things,
fraud or tying agreements. 54 The court found that Westinghouse had done
no more than license some of its patents and refuse to license others. Be-
cause this practice is authorized by patent laws, as opposed to being an
expansion of the patent grant, Westinghouse did not violate the antitrust
laws. The court relied on the "reasonably adapted" language of General
Electric55 to support its conclusion that licensing some patents but not
others is within the patent grant. 56 The court further observed that the
51. The district court found that the Japanese firms' failure to enter the American market resulted
from fear of patent infringement rather than from an agreement not to compete. 471 F. Supp. at
539-40. The district court dismissed the claims based on alleged tying arrangements because the
government failed to present evidence concerning the substantiality of the restraint on commerce. Id.
at 544. The patent abuse claim was predicated on the allegation that Westinghouse required MELCO
and MHI to pay royalties on products not incorporating transferred patent technology. Because such
an arrangement amounts to misuse only if coercion is involved, the district court also dismissed that
claim. Id. at 545.
52. The court of appeals noted with surprise the "'tergiversations" in the goverment's presenta-
tion of its claim for relief. 648 F.2d at 645.
53. Id. at 645-46.
54. Such instances include price-fixing, conditioning the license grant on the payment of royal-
ties on unpatented products, and accumulating all patents relevant to an industry to achieve monopo-
listic control. Id. at 647.
55. United States v. General Electric Co.. 272 U.S. at 490.
56. 648 F.2d at 647.
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government's theory on appeal was without precedence in case law and
would substantially reduce the scope of the patent monopoly. 57
The court also considered the relationship of United States law to the
foreign patents that Westinghouse licensed to Mitsubishi. The court
quoted from Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 58 in which the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that because territorial restrictions in the United States were per-
mitted by the patent code, "a patentee could do the same thing with for-
eign licenses without violating the antitrust laws of this country.' 59
The court next addressed the government's argument that the motive of
the parties is immaterial if the effect of an agreement is to unreasonably
limit competition. In essence, the government sought to apply the rule of
reason to the agreements. 60 The court found this argument seriously
flawed. The district court had concluded that the reason Mitsubishi did
not compete in the United States was fear of infringing Westinghouse's
patents. Therefore the lack of competition was caused by the protection
afforded by the patents and not by the technology-sharing agreements.
The government failed to show a causal link between the agreements and
the injury to competition. 61
III. ANALYSIS
As the court in Westinghouse noted, patent holders may run afoul of
the antitrust laws by attempting to expand the patent monopoly by mis-
use, agreement, or accumulation. The novel feature of the government's
theory is that it contends a patent holder could also violate the antitrust
laws simply by licensing its foreign patents while not simultaneously li-
censing its corresponding United States patents. 62 The consequence of
this course of conduct is to bar the foreign firm from the United States
market because any attempt to manufacture, sell, or use the patented
products there would result in an infringement suit. In rejecting the gov-
ernment's theory, the court simply labelled Westinghouse's activities as
"reasonably adapted" to secure reward for the patent monopoly. It found
that Westinghouse's activities did not overstep the bounds of the patent
grant.
57. Id. at 648.
58. 484 F.2d 407(6th Cir. 1973).
59. Id. at 417. Cf. note 44 supra (discussing statutory authorization of territorial restrictions on
patent licensing in the United States and foreign nations).
60. See note 18 and accompanying text supra (discussion of the rule of reason).
61. 648 F.2d at 648-49. The balance of the opinion deals with discovery sanctions.
62. The theory was articulated by Richard Stem, then chief of the Patent Unit of the Antitrust
Division. See R. Stem, The Antitrust Status of Territorial Limitations in International Licensing, 14
IDEA 580 (1971).
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The court's cursory analysis is troublesome because it gives little guid-
ance to parties entering into international licensing agreements. The old
international cartel cases, such as ICI and Timken, involved an aggrega-
tion of restraints on trade and left uncertainty in this area. 63 The narrow
holding of United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. is that a patent
licensing agreement without more does not violate the Sherman Act.
Westinghouse and Mitsubishi engaged in cross-licensing 64 and their
agreements covered present and future patents. 65 The court did not dis-
cuss these factors, which have raised antitrust concerns in previous
cases. 66
Furthermore, the court did not clarify the role of the patent code in the
international arena. The court relied in part on section 261 of the patent
code, which authorizes territorial restrictions within the United States, to
uphold the agreements. It also emphasized the right of a patent holder not
to license. Parties who want to incorporate territorial restrictions into their
agreements, or who want to cross-license or engage in other practices,
have no standard for assessing the legality of the restraints.
Professor Sullivan, a well-known antitrust commentator, described an
analytical framework for resolving patent-antitrust conflicts that provides
such a standard. 67 In essence, his analysis involves examining the poli-
cies behind the two laws in the factual settings at hand. If the policies of a
statute are not truly engaged, the statute gives way. Application of this
analysis to the facts of Westinghouse reveals that the court reached the
correct result. 68
A. The Patent Aspects
The Sherman Act prohibits agreements in restraint of trade. A Westing-
house-type licensing agreement, even if it relies on the patent laws for the
restraining effect, is an agreement in restraint of trade because the licen-
see may not manufacture or sell patented goods in those countries in
63. Wallace, supra note I, at 280.
64. 648 F.2d at 645. in cross-licensing two or more parties, each owning proprietary technology.
assign geographic territories to each contracting party and then turn over technology to the parties for
use in the specified territories. Adelman & Brooks, Territorial Restraints in International Technology
Agreements after Topco, 17 ANTITRUST BULL 763, 769-70 (1972). A cross-license in itself is not
illegal. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE ANDTHE ANTITRUST LAWS 289 (2d ed. 1973).
65. Brief for Appellant at 10, United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.
1981).
66. See. e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 190-92 (1963): United States v.
Nat'l Lead Co.. 63 F. Supp. 513, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
67. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF ANTITRUST 533-38 (1977).
68. The facts relevant to this analysis may not have been fully developed at the trial court level.
Thus, this analysis may be incomplete.
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which it has not been granted a patent. This literal reading of the antitrust
laws fails to account for a peculiarity of the patent system: exclusion of
others is inherent in the patent grant. As the Westinghouse court ob-
served, a holding that a failure to license vi6lates the Sherman Act would
invalidate almost every patent licensing agreement. 69 To avoid this prob-
lem, the Department of Justice attempted to limit Sherman Act liability to
longterm, multiproduct agreements involving a concentrated market like
the Westinghouse-Mitsubishi agreements. 70 This limitation is inappropri-
ate.
A probable result of adopting the government's argument would be to
discourage licensing agreements. A patent holder often utilizes a patent in
its home market and licenses the same patent to a foreign firm under the
foreign patent code. The patent holder derives additional financial benefit
from the foreign license while exploiting the patent at home. Manufactur-
ers who are reluctant to face competition from their own technology may
choose not to license at all rather than face the possibility of having to
grant licenses in their home markets. To the extent that firms treat licens-
ing royalties as a subsidy for research and development, the result would
be a lessening of innovation. This result defeats the purpose of the patent
system.
A paradoxical aspect of the Westinghouse case was the assertion that
Mitsubishi's dependency on Westinghouse technology formed the
grounds for a violation. A well-known danger in international technology
transfer agreements, illustrated by the ICI and Timken cases, is that the
parties may use the technology as a device to divide markets. 71 Valueless
technology, or products not covered by technology, flag an agreement as
a sham to allocate territories. The premise of the government's theory
was that Mitsubishi acquired valuable technology-so valuable that Mi-
tsubishi could not function without it. Therefore, the defendants were not
using the licenses as a mere device to allocate markets.
Upholding the agreements furthers patent policies. One purpose of the
patent system is to reward invention, and Westinghouse was seeking its
reward through licensing. Unlike the defendants in the earlier cartel
cases, Westinghouse was not abusing the system by deliberately includ-
ing in the agreements products that were not covered by patents.
69. 648 F.2d at 648.
70. Reply Brief for the United States at 19, United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d
642 (9th Cir. 1981). The Westinghouse-Mitsubishi agreements had been in effect since 1923. The
1970 complaint indicated that the agreements covered such products as power circuit breakers, trans-
formers, air conditioning, elevators, refrigerators, television receivers, x-ray equipment, and lighting
equipment. W. FUGATE, supra note 64, at 293.
71. See also United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 192 (1963) (purpose of cross-
license agreement was to protect against Japanese competition).
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B. The Antitrust Aspects
Antitrust policies also were implicated in Westinghouse. The agree-
ments were longstanding, covered a multitude of products, 72 and affected
the concentrated electrical equipment market. Furthermore, territorial re-
strictions among competitors are such a serious restraint that ordinarily
they are per se illegal. 73
A closer examination shows that certain factors lessen the importance
of the antitrust policies implicated in Westinghouse. First, the Westing-
house court indicated that MELCO and MHI would probably not, on their
own, have developed the technology to enable them to compete in the
United States market. 74 If, absent the agreements, the firms would not
have developed into potential competitors, the agreements had no effect
on the competitive climate.
A second consideration is that the Westinghouse patents did not present
insurmountable barriers to entry in the United States markets, 75 nor were
MELCO and MHI the only potential entrants. The government indicated
that two other Japanese firms, Toshiba and Hitachi, marketed heavy elec-
trical equipment in the United States. 76
Third, although the defendants engaged in cross-licensing, by 1967
Westinghouse could enter the Japanese market under its license with
MHI. 77 Cross-licenses with bilateral territorial restrictions have fre-
quently been central to cartelization schemes. 78 The Westinghouse-Mi-
tsubishi licenses did not fit the pattern of the international cartel cases
because the licensing agreements, at least by 1967, were not mutually
exclusive.
Finally, the agreements did not contain clauses prohibiting Mitsubishi
from entering the United States market. Rather, Westinghouse relied on
the operation of patent law to bar Mitsubishi from selling in the American
market. One might regard this distinction as theoretical because the effect
72. Although the number of products involved raises antitrust concerns, for purposes of applying
patent policy, a significant consideration is whether all products incorporate patented technology.
73. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Whether the restraints in Westing-
house would properly be characterized as horizontal is unclear. The defendants were in a valid licen-
sor-licensee relationship involving exchanges of useful technology. The territorial restrictions could
be thought of as vertical, as in the GTE Sylvania case, see note 17 and accompanying text supra, and
subject to less peremptory antitrust condemnation.
74. 648 F.2d at 648. See generally Yamamura, A Retrospect and Prospect on the Postwar Jap-
anese Economy, 3 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON RESEARCH 253. 254-56 (1976) (effect of availability of
Western technology on the Japanese economy).
75. 471F.Supp.at541.
76. Brief for the United States of America at 7, United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.. 648
F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981).
77. 471 F. Supp. at541.
78. Adelman & Brooks, supra note 64, at 770.
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of the agreements was to allocate territories. 79 Nonetheless, only those
products actually covered by patents were-restricted. The district court's
finding, that patent motivation rather than a tacit agreement inhibited Mi-
tsubishi from competing in America, goes directly to this issue.
In sum, the antitrust concerns in Westinghouse were less strong than
-the patent policies. The government's claim that Mitsubishi was depen-
dent on Westinghouse technology established the validity of the technol-
ogy transfers. The district court's finding of patent motivation provides a
further indication that the agreements were based on practices protected
by the patent system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The usual response of courts to patent-antitrust conflicts involving ter-
ritorial restrictions is to validate the restriction unless, the parties are en-
gaging in conduct not within the patent grant. This response eschews an
examination of the policies behind the two bodies of law and does not
question whether the policy of the favored law will be advanced.
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the court adhered to
the established pattern. The court's holding settled a troublesome point of
licensing law raised by the 1970 Department of Justice complaint. A re-
strictive reading of the decision would limit it to "pure" licensing agree-
ments, but partiesto technology transfer agreements may wish to do more
than license some patents and refuse to license others. A policy analysis,
such as that set out above, provides guidelines .for assessing the possible
antitrust consequences of the restrictive clauses.
Christina Marie Ager
79. Stem, supra note 62, at 582 ("niceties in wording will not save what is otherwise an unlaw-
ful scheme.").
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